I seem to be spending most of my life
at the ODI
at the moment, largely because it is producing an apparently endless stream of
really useful research papers and seminars. Yesterday saw a combo of the two,
as it launched Unblocking
Results: using aid to address governance constraints in public service delivery
(OK, maybe it still has a thing or two to learn about snappy titles…..).
The starting point for the work is
that while there is a vast amount of research on the role of institutions in
delivering (or failing to deliver) health, education, water etc, there is very
little on the role of aid agencies when things go well. So ODI carried out a positive deviance
exercise, identifying 4 success stories out of 60 initial candidates, and then
delving into the reasons behind the success.
They were a rural water programme in
Tanzania, a pay and attendance monitoring programme in Sierra Leone, support
for the government Strategy and Policy Unit, also in Sierra Leone, and a local
government programme in Uganda.
According to the report, ‘Six factors
seem critical in this regard and provide clear implications for the design and
implementation of aid packages that seek to address service delivery blockages.
Apart from the first (windows of opportunity), they are all within the control
of external partners to pursue. However, in most cases, they would also require
considerable deviation from current practice.’
The six, complete with natty graphic
(right) are:
Identifying and seizing windows of
opportunity:
plenty of overlap with my own work on shocks as drivers of change.
The authors described what I now call WoOs (sorry) as the most significant
common factor behind the success stories. But it’s not just a question of
waiting around for a shock – prior relationships, trust and knowledge are
crucial to being able to seize WoOs, as is a ready source of at least limited funding.
Focusing on reforms with tangible
political pay-offs:
governments listen to aid agencies when they help deliver ‘tangible goods and
services that politicians could capitalise on in their campaigns.’ i.e. unless
you align political self-interest with governance reform, you can forget it.
Building on what exists to implement
legal mandates:
concentrate on the implementation gaps that already exist, rather than
rewriting current rules and laws, even if that means accepting the reviled
‘second best solutions.’
Moving beyond reliance on policy
dialogue:
Building on the previous point, ‘[successful] aid packages seem to focus on
‘getting things working’ rather than perfecting the framework (through the
development of laws, procedures, regulations, policy processes).’ Nuts and
bolts, not endless seminars.
Facilitating problem solving and local
collective action solutions:
yep, it’s our old friend, convening and
brokering. One speaker worried about a ‘scramble to convene and
broker’, which could make the per diem
culture of East Africa and elsewhere look like a garden party.
Adaptation by learning: ‘Aid packages benefit from in-built
flexibility that allows for regular programme adjustment based on learning and
changes in the local context.’
If this sounds familiar, it’s because
it is – it echoes work by Matt Andrews,
the Africa Power
and Politics Programme, and a lot of the stuff on ‘how change
happens’ on this blog. Sue Unsworth reckons we are reaching some kind of
‘critical mass’ of research findings. Rebecca Simson of ODI helpfully
summarized the so what’s for donors in this table (it’s not in the report, but
Matt Andrews wisely advised them that unless they can offer a table of so
whats, the donors won’t listen).
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